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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case proceeded to a Jury Trial on June 6, 2013; at which time Mr. Eauclaire was 
convicted of Possession of Paraphernalia. Mr. Eauclaire filed his Notice of Appeal on July 5, 
2013; an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 23, 2013; finally the Second Amended Notice of 
Appeal on August 13, 2013. The District Court heard argument and took the matter under 
advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the 
conviction on January 2, 2014, and Mr. Eauclaire now timely appeals. 
On appeal, Mr. Eauclaire asserts the following: 1) that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: A) Mr. Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of 
paraphernalia or physical control over it; and B) Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use the 
paraphernalia to ingest a controlled substance, and 2) that the trial court erred by failing to grant 
a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct which occurred when the prosecutor declared Mr. 
Eauclaire a liar and vouched for the credibility of the States witnesses. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mitchell Eauclaire is a subcontractor through Pacific Home and Patio; as part of his 
employment he must participate in random drug tests. (08/1/13 Tr., p.71, Ls.18-19). Mitchell 
uses his truck for work purposes and has taken it to many job sites and many other individuals 
have access to his truck. (08/1/13 Tr., p.80. Ls.4-20). Mitchell also works full-time at Jimmy 
Johns during the winter months, when construction is slow in order to make a living. (08/1/13 
Tr., p.79, Ls.11-15). Mitchell also goes camping a lot with his truck and those that go camping 
with him also have access to his truck and the unlocked toolbox which sits in the bed of the 
truck. (08/1/13 Tr., p.75. Ls.17-25). He admittedly used marijuana occasionally in the past, but 
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stopped when he graduated from high school, three years ago, in order to keep his job and take 
care of his responsibilities such as rent, bills and a girlfriend. (08/1/13 Tr., p. 72, Ls.2-18). 
On February 23, 2013 Trooper Brandon Bake of the Idaho State Police stopped to assist a 
stranded motorist. (08/1/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-10). Trooper Bake then walked up to the vehicle to 
talk to the two passengers that were inside and thought that he smelled marijuana. (08/1/13 Tr., 
p.8, Ls.13-18). The passengers explained that they had run out of gas and that the driver had 
gone to get gas (08/1/13 Tr., p.9, Ls. 14-16). Trooper Bake asked what kind of assistance was 
needed and if there was any marijuana in the vehicle to which the passengers responded that 
there was not after which he called Officer Plaisted for a canine assist. (08/1/13 Tr. p.11, Ls. 1-
9). The driver, Mr. Eauclaire, later showed up with a gas can and talked to Trooper Bake. 
(08/1/13 Tr. p.10, Ls. 1-4). 
On February 23, 2013 Officer Marshall Plaisted of the Boise Police Department was 
contacted by Trooper Bake to assist with the traffic stop. (08/1/13 Tr., p.44, Ls.23-24). When he 
arrived at the scene, Officer Plaisted walked his canine around the car checking for any sign of 
drugs. (08/1/13 Tr., p.45, L.25-p.46, L.1 ). Office Plaisted believed he smelled the odor of fresh 
marijuana as he approached the vehicle. (08/1/13 Tr., p.52, Ls.1-3). It is of note that no 
marijuana was discovered in the vehicle. (08/1/13 Tr., p 52, Ls.10-15 - p.55, Ls. 7-12). Officer 
Plaisted also stated that he knew from experience and training the difference between the smell 
of fresh marijuana and burnt marijuana. (08/1/13 Tr., p.53, Ls. 12-25-p. 54, Ls. 1-24). The 
canine alerted to the door of the vehicle on the passenger side, along the door seal up to the 
handle and right below it. (08/1/13 Tr., p.57, Ls. 21-25 p.59, Ls. 21-23). 
After the canine alerted to the vehicle, Trooper Bake and Officer Plaisted began 
searching the vehicle. (08/1/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.13-14.) During the ten minute search of the cab 
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nothing illegal was discovered. (08/1/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.16-19.) Trooper Bake then got into the 
bed of the truck and began searching the unblocked toolbox area. (08/1/13 Tr., p.34, Ls.20-25.) 
After looking for a while and moving several items in the toolbox, Trooper Bake found a small 
glass multicolored pipe in the unlocked toolbox on the driver's side. (08/1/13 Tr., p.35, Ls.1-10). 
The pipe was not warm or smoking, there was no evidence of recent use, and the pipe was never 
sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for testing. (08/1/13 Tr., p.35, Ls. 23-25-p.36, Ls. 
1-9). Nothing else illegal was ever discovered in the vehicle, including marijuana. (08/1/13 Tr., 
p.37, Ls. 8-10). 
Trooper Bake then asked whose pipe it was to which Mr. Eauclaire responded, "Pipe? 
Under the tool box?" in a surprised manner. (08/1/13 Tr., p.36. Ls.15-20). Trooper Bake then 
asked whose pipe it was again after finding nothing else during the search to which Mr. 
Eauclaire responded "Well, it is probably mine from a long time ago, Could have been there for 
several years." (08/1 /l 3 Tr., p.3 7, Ls.8-15). Other than that statement there was no indication 
that Mr. Eauclaire knew that the pipe was there, that he had been using it or that it had been used 
more recently than several years ago or even what the burnt residue inside the pipe was. (08/1/13 
Tr., p.37, Ls. 24-25 -p. 38, Ls. 1-22). 
3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
It 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I ! I 
I. 
II. 
ISSUES 
Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: A) Mr. 
Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of paraphernalia or physical control over it; 
and B) Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use paraphernalia to ingest a 
controlled substance? 
Did the trial court err by not granting a mistrial when the State engaged in misconduct 
by declaring Mr. Eauclaire a liar and vouching for the credibility of the State's 
witnesses which deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial? 
4 
• I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I . 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That: 1) Mr. Eauclaire 
Had Knowledge Of The Presence Of Paraphernalia Or Physical Control Over It; 2) Mr. Eauclaire 
Had The Requisite Intent To Use Paraphernalia To Ingest A Controlled Substance. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Eauclaire asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of 
paraphernalia. Specifically, there was no evidence presented proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of paraphernalia, that Mr. Eauclaire was in 
possession of paraphernalia and that Mr. Eauclaire possessed paraphernalia with the requisite 
intent to use it to ingest a controlled substance. 
B. Standard of Review 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of 
conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on appeal where there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution 
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 594, 944 P.2d 727, 729 (Ct. App. 1997). A reasonable trier of 
fact could not have found that the prosecution in this case sustained its burden of proving that 
Mr. Eauclaire knew or should have known of the existence of the paraphernalia, exercised 
control and dominion over it or had the required intent to use. 
An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of 
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). The right to 
demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt 
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standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of 
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 
(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N .E.2d 620, 631 (Ill. 2004 ). 
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that: 
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on 
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt ... [w]e will not substitute our 
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution . 
Id. at 594-595, 944 P.2d at 729-730 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Mitchell, 13 0 Idaho 134, 93 7 P .2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, 
"[ e ]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961. 
"The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The 
defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant." 
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566, 570 (Ct. App. 1995). 
On appeal, it is clear the Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the 
Jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 
1149, 1162-63 (Ct.App.1983). 
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1. There is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Eauclaire had knowledge of the presence of paraphernalia or physical 
control over it. 
Mr. Eauclaire asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of 
paraphernalia. Specifically, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he knew of the pipe's presence. Knowledge is a required element of the crime that the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For example, in State v. Warden, there was no record of competent and substantial 
evidence to support the verdict of conviction on the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance. State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 754, 554 P.2d 684, 686 (1976). In that case, at the 
time of the entry of the officers into the bedroom no burning substance was observed, no person 
at any location in the trailer house was seen to be in actual possession of anything which was or 
appeared to be a controlled substance and no admissions or statements of any kind were made by 
any persons admitting or inferring the possession of a controlled substance. Id. The charge of 
possession was based on the fact that the defendant had occupied the trailer prior to his arrest and 
thus was in possession of the premises where the controlled substance was found. Id. 
Much like this case, Mr. Eauclaire was not the exclusive user of the truck and therefore 
there can be no legitimate inference that he knew of the paraphernalia and had control of it since 
there are no other circumstances or incriminating statements that would support it. The 
statements made consisted of a surprised statement of "Pipe? In the toolbox?" and a statement 
that Mr. Eauclaire assumed that since it was in his truck it must be his but if it was it was from 
many years ago. (08/1/13 Tr., p.36. Ls.15-20.- Tr., p.37, Ls.8-15.) This does not support the 
requirement that Mr. Eauclaire knew of its presence and had physical control over it, or had the 
power and intention to control it. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
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evidence which was introduced at trial was that at some time, years ago, Mr. Eauclaire may have 
used or known about the pipe. 
Conversely, where there is additional evidence presented that tends to establish the 
defendant's constructive possession such as proof of residency and marijuana and various drug-
related paraphernalia found in common areas to which the defendant had access there may be 
sufficient evidence. State v. Greene, 100 Idaho 464, 466, 600 P.2d 140, 142 (1979). In Greene, 
the defendant demonstrated some knowledge of the presence of the drugs and of their illegal 
nature when he stated that "he knew about the marijuana, but he didn't know anything about the 
heroin." This incriminating statement could justify a jury making the reasonable inference that 
Greene knew of the marijuana and had control of it. 
Finally, "Evidence that a defendant has a possessory interest in premises on which drugs 
are found has often been held to establish possession of an illegal or controlled substance." 
However, where the defendant is in non-exclusive possession of the premises upon which drugs 
were found there can be no legitimate inference that he knew of the drugs and had control of 
them in the absence of other circumstances such as incriminating statements which tend to 
support such inference. Warden, 97 Idaho at 754, 554 P.2d at 686. 
However, in State v. Crawford, there was substantial evidence that although the 
defendant may not have been in exclusive possession of her residence, she did have exclusive 
possession of her bedroom since there is an assumption that bedrooms are usually private areas 
of the house indicating sole occupancy. Therefore, in that case, the court concluded that the jury's 
verdict of guilty on the charge of possession of controlled substance was supported by sufficient 
evidence. Crawford, 130 Idaho at 595, 944 P.2d at 730. 
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There is no such sufficient evidence in this case due to the fact that a truck is not 
considered to be a private area and many other people other than the defendant had access to the 
truck. Mr. Eauclaire stated that he uses the truck as a work vehicle that many people have access 
too. He also explained that he goes camping a lot with his truck and those that go camping have 
access to his truck as well. Mr. Eauclaire was not the only person with access to the vehicle and 
there is no evidence that shows that Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite dominion and control over 
the paraphernalia. 
Mr. Eauclaire asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he knew or 
should have known that he was in possession of paraphernalia. A conviction cannot be based on 
circumstantial evidence where such evidence is capable of explanation by a reasonable 
hypothesis consistent with innocence. Mr. Eauclaire further argues that there was no evidence 
from which the jury in his case could draw reasonable and justifiable inferences of guilt. State v. 
Ojeda, 119 Idaho 862,810 P.2d 1148 (Ct.App.1991). 
In this case, any statements made by Mr. Eauclaire could not amount to admissions that 
would justify an inference of possession of paraphernalia with the intent to use. During the ten 
minute search of the cab nothing illegal was discovered. After looking for a while and moving 
several items in the toolbox, Trooper Bake found a small glass multicolored pipe buried in the 
toolbox on the driver's side. The pipe was not warm or smoking, there was no evidence of 
recent use, and the pipe was never sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for testing. 
Nothing else illegal was ever discovered in the vehicle, including marijuana. There is no 
evidence that Mr. Eauclaire knew or should have known that there was a pipe buried in the 
toolbox of his truck. There was nothing else illegal. There was no evidence of any marijuana or 
other paraphernalia on Mr. Eauclaire' s person or in his truck. Many other people could 
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potentially have had access to the unlocked toolbox of his truck and there was not substantial 
testimony which would lead a reasonable trier of fact to infer that Mr. Eauclaire knew or should 
have known of the presence of paraphernalia. 
2. There is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use paraphernalia to ingest a 
controlled substance. 
Mr. Eauclaire asserts there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of 
paraphernalia. Specifically, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he had intent to use the paraphernalia for the purpose of inhaling or otherwise introducing 
into the body a controlled substance. Intent is a required element of the crime that the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, there was no testimony presented which would lead a 
reasonable trier of fact to come to that conclusion. 
In this case the evidence which was presented at trial included testimony from Trooper 
Brandon Bake an Idaho State Trooper who testified that he was the officer who conducted the 
initial traffic stop. He conducted the traffic stop to inquire if the stranded car required any 
assistance. Trooper Bake believed he smelled the odor of marijuana so he contacted Officer 
Marshall Plaisted of the Boise Police Department to assist with the traffic stop. 
Officer Plaisted stated that when he arrived at the scene, he believed he smelled the odor 
of fresh marijuana. Officer Plaisted also stated that he knew from experience and training the 
difference between the smell of fresh marijuana and burnt marijuana. The only illegal item that 
was found was the small pipe. No marijuana burnt or fresh was discovered. Officer Plaisted 
walked his canine around the car checking for any sign of drugs. Both officers searched the cab 
of the vehicle and found nothing. The canine alerted to the passenger side door seal and the 
officers began searching the area where they again found nothing. A search of the toolbox in the 
10 
bed of the vehicle revealed a small glass pipe buried under several items on the driver's side of 
the toolbox. Trooper Bake then asked whose pipe it was again after finding nothing else during 
the search to which Mr. Eauclaire responded "Well, it is probably mine from a long time ago, 
could have been there for several years." Other than that statement there was no evidence that 
Mr. Eauclaire knew that the pipe was there, that he had been using it or had any intent to use it or 
even what the burnt residue inside was. The pipe was not warm or smoking, there was no 
evidence of recent use and the pipe was never sent to the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab for 
testing. No substantial and competent evidence as to what residue was in the pipe was ever 
admitted. One officer testified as to the odor of fresh marijuana, the other officer testified that 
there is no difference between fresh marihuana and burnt marijuana, there was not even enough 
residue to NIK test the substance to affirm officer's suspicions. 
There was not substantial testimony which would lead a reasonable trier of fact to infer 
that Mr. Eauclaire had the requisite intent to use the paraphernalia for the purpose of inhaling or 
otherwise introducing into the body a controlled substance. In order for there to be sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find Mr. Eauclaire guilty of possession of paraphernalia, there would 
have had to have been more evidence such as finding actual marijuana in the vehicle or finding 
the paraphernalia on his person or at least hot and smoking. The evidence was not sufficient for 
the jury to find Mr. Eauclaire guilty of possession of paraphernalia. 
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II. 
The Trial Court Erred By Not Granting A Mistrial When The State Engaged In Misconduct By 
Declaring Mr. Eauclaire A Liar And Vouching For The Credibility Of The States Witnesses 
Which Deprived The Defendant Of His Right To A Fair Trial. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Eauclaire was arrested for possession of paraphernalia on February 23, 2013. Mr. 
Eauclaire asserts that the trial court erred by failing to reasonably exercise its discretion when it 
failed to grant a mistrial after the state conducted sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to warrant 
the granting of a Rule 29.1 Motion for Mistrial by declaring the defendant a liar and vouching for 
the credibility of the States witnesses during the closing statements. 
B. Standard of Review 
The question on appeal is whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in 
light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. State v, Sandoval-Tena, 138 
Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003). The court is to examine whether the event that 
precipitated the motion constituted reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. 
Id. The focus should be upon the ultimate impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the 
mistrial motion. The trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that event, 
viewed retrospectively, amounted to reversible error. State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 
P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct.App.1983). An error is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing 
court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227, 
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
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C. The trial court erred when it declined to grant the defense motion for mistrial, because the 
trial court failed to reasonably exercise its discretion in light of circumstances existing 
when the mistrial motion was made; after the state conducted sufficient prosecutorial 
misconduct by vouching for the credibility of witnesses during the closing statements. 
Mr. Eauclaire contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct and the judge failed to 
reasonably exercise its discretion in light of circumstances existing when the motion for mistrial 
was made. Defense counsel raised a motion for mistrial regarding the misconduct of vouching 
for the credibility of witnesses. That colloquy proceeded as follows: 
(Closing Arguments) 
MR. BOOKER: " ... You've heard a very convenient chain of story from the 
defendant today. On the date that this happened, you heard the defendant was 
minimizing his involvement. You heard a defendant who said, "Probably mine from a 
long time ago," minimizing his involvement because he knows he's just about to get 
busted for possessing drug paraphernalia. Today you heard the defendant straight out 
lie." 
" ... And I'll say to be fair, you have to judge the credibility of the officer as well, 
whether he was truthful or not as well. And I'll argue that the officers were absolutely 
truthful." 
MS. TOLMAN: Objection, Judge. Improper argument. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
MR. BOOKER: The credibility is going to be the central part of your determination 
today as to whether this defendant did, in fact, commit-
THE COURT: And, counsel, I need to-I just need to make a comment to the jury. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are the fact finders in this case. Your job is to 
determine the credibility of the witness. That is your purview alone. You may 
continue, Mr. Booker. 
(08/1/13 Tr., p.101, Ls.9 -17 p.102, Ls.9 -25)(emphasis added) 
(Jury Out) 
After the jury retired to deliberate, Mr. Eauclaire asked for a Rule 29.1 motion for a mistrial and 
the issue was discussed as follows: 
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MS. TOLMAN: For purposes of creating a record for appeal, Judge, I'm going to ask 
at this time for a Rule 29 .1 motion for a mistrial. On motion of defendant, a mistrial 
may be declared when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the 
proceedings or conduct inside or outside the courtroom which is prejudicial to the 
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial. 
I believe the State made absolutely very improper statements during closing 
arguments with regard to vouching for the credibility of their officers saying I submit 
to you they're telling the truth .... 
THE COURT: Mr. Booker, response? 
MR. BOOKER: Your Honor, the State would just say that the State said repeatedly 
that it is - it is in the jury's purview. They are to determine credibility. And any 
mistake that there could have been, whether there was or not, I would just argue that 
it was corrected by the Court in the instruction given by the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Booker. What I heard was Mr. Booker 
indicating to the jury the gist of it, although I do not have the--don't recall the exact 
words, were that the officers were testifying truthfully or you can believe the officers 
because they were truthful. Ms. Tolman made a timely objection. The Court made a 
curative instruction. I believe that that instruction was sufficient to remind the jury 
not specifically that they were the fact finders, but specifically that they were the sole 
judges of the credibility of the witnesses who testified. So I believe that that's 
sufficient. I'm going to deny your motion ... 
(08/1/13 Tr., p.123, Ls.3 16--p.124, Ls.14-25-p.125, Ls. 1-12.)(emphasis added) 
"A mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the 
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which 
is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.l(a). In this 
case, the violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct was prejudicial to the defendant 
and deprived him of a fair trial. IRPC 3 .4( e) states that a lawyer shall not: "in trial... state a 
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a 
civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused ... " IRPC RULE 3 .4. "A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility 
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice ... " 
IRPC Rule 3.8. The prosecution violated these rules by vouching for the credibility of witnesses 
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during his closing argument thereby disregarding the Bill of Rights and the right to a fair trial 
enumerated therein. 
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of 
fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct.App.2007). 
"Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury 
and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom." State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369, 233 P.3d 1286, 1291 
(Ct.App.2010). However, closing argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and 
beliefs about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Phillips, 144 
Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. "Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government 
behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity, or suggesting that 
information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony." United States v. 
Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993). 
More importantly, the possibility of prejudicial effect stemming from vouching is 
increased in cases where credibility is of particular importance. United States v. Weatherspoon, 
410 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir.2005). Vouching is particularly dangerous because a jury "may be 
inclined to give weight to the prosecutor's opinion in assessing the credibility of witnesses, 
instead of making the independent judgment of credibility to which the defendant is entitled." 
United States v. McKay, 771 F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir.1985). Failures to correct the improper 
statements at the time they were made cannot be salvaged by the later generalized jury 
instruction reminding jurors that a lawyer's statements during closing argument do not constitute 
evidence. United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir.1990). 
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The standard for reviewing a court's denial of a motion for mistrial is well established. 
"When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error supported by a 
contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural or evidentiary error we review the 
denial of a motion for mistrial for reversible error." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 
273, 285 (2007). The question on appeal is whether the event which precipitated the motion for 
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. The focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial 
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, 
constituted reversible error. To be reversible error, the error must have misled the jury or 
prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). 
When considering the denial of a motion for mistrial that arises out of argument, "the threshold 
inquiry is whether the state introduced error." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 
128, 136 (Ct.App.2008). In this case, the prosecutor introduced error by vouching for the state's 
witnesses during closing argument thereby misleading the jury into believing that the state was 
vouching for their credibility which made it impossible for the jury to determine the evidence for 
themselves in the course of a fair trial. 
Relating the facts and urging the jury to reach a conclusion about credibility is acceptable 
conduct, but stating personal opinions about credibility is misconduct. State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 
269, 273, 245 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Ct. App. 2010). Statements about credibility come from 
misrepresentations of evidence of facts not in evidence such as inconsistencies in the witness's 
story that are not proven by evidence are also misconduct. Id. Generally, it may be improper to 
label the defendant as a "liar," for testimony given in his or her defense. State v. Gross, 146 
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Idaho 15, 18-19 (Ct. App. 2008). It is not misconduct, however, to refer to the defendant as a liar 
if the defendant admitted to lying in connection with the case. Id. 
For example, in Gross, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by suggesting that the jury 
"should trust and believe the officer and the prosecutor because they represented the state and, 
therefore, must be ethical," because the comments were opinion and not based on the evidence 
presented at trial. Id. The misconduct that took place in this case is similar. The prosecution not 
only vouched for the officer's credibility but also stated that the defendant was not telling the 
truth. Relating the facts and urging the jury to draw their own conclusion is proper, but that is 
not what happened in this case. The State drew the conclusion for them by stating the defendant 
lied and that his officers were being absolutely truthful. This conduct was improper and warrants 
a mistrial due to the fact that the statements constitute reversible error because they misled the 
jury into thinking that the state was affirmatively stating that they must believe the statements 
made by officers and discredit those made by the defendant. The statements made during closing 
arguments prejudiced the jury against the defendant in such a manner that the result of the trial 
could not be fair disregarding the Bill of Rights, specifically the right to a fair trial thus 
mandating a new trial. 
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order held that "to the extent, if any, 
that the prosecutor's comments were improper, in the Court's view, they were alleviated by 
Judge Gardunia' s immediate admonition to the jury that they "are the fact finders in this case. 
Your job is to determine the credibility of the witness. That is your purview alone." (R., p.134.) 
However, many courts have routinely held that improper statements cannot be salvaged by later 
generalized jury instructions. See United States v. Simtob, 90 I F.2d 799, (9th Cir.1990). 
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It simply cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in allowing vouching 
for the credibility of witnesses and calling the defendant a liar and then offering an ineffective 
curative instruction did not contribute to the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Eauclaire respectfully requests that this court vacate 
his judgment of conviction and his case be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 7th day of May 2014. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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